The State of Utah v. Lawrence Marhsall Jackson : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
The State of Utah v. Lawrence Marhsall Jackson :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Lori J. Seppi; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorney for Appellant.
Ryan D. Tenney; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Attorneys
for Appellee.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Jackson, No. 20080418 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/918
AFT'TAn COURT OF APPEALS 
TIILSLA'IL <*! : • \ :- : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
HENRY LOUIS JACKSON, : Case No 200811 I I i, ( ,\ 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is incarcerated. 
REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal hum a judgiuun vi i uiii'.iuii i i< •. u.u eouiils •. •: .• >. uei: i piei; c! in.uiai 
1 loh.'cide, a first degree felon)', in violation oi'Utah Code Ann. ij 76-5-202 (Supp. 2u;n), 
one count of Crucll} to Animals, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-9- 30 i (2003). and one count of Assault, a class B misdemeanor, in violation oft •••.•.!; 
Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (2003). in the Third indicia! Distrv! Court, in ;;::d for S.sii Lake 
Count}. State of! jtuh. the 1 l.morabL- Randall Skanchx presiding. 
I . i ; i<. • 0 I ' L . 
SAL1 LAKE LEG A;. i ;hi IA- |{ ASSO( . 
424 Last 500 South. Suite 300 
Sal! 1 akeCit}. i U:l: y * 1 i I 
Attorney for Appellant 
R'i A \ ! ) . 1 L N N J Y iVN.o;-) 
Assistant Attonic) General 
MARK SHURTLEFF (4666) 
V n O R N E Y C E N K R A L 
lleber M. Wells Building 
160 l^ast 300 Sonlh. 6,h 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, LIT 841 LLC»'-4 
FILED 
Attorneys for Appellee U T A H APPELLATE COURTS 
SEP 2 t, 2009 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
HENRY LOUIS JACKSON, : Case No. 20080418-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is incarcerated. 
REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for two counts of Attempted Criminal 
Homicide, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (Supp. 2006), 
one count of Cruelty to Animals, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-9-301 (2003), and one count of Assault, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (2003), in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Randall Skanchy presiding. 
LORI J. SEPPI (9428) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
RYAN D. TENNEY (9866) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK SHURTLEFF (4666) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6lh Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
INTRODUCTION 1 
ARGUMENT 2 
I. JACKSON ADEQUATELY BRIEFED HIS ARGUMENT THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING DETECTIVE 
WINTERS TO TESTIFY ABOUT KATHY'S PRIOR CONSISTENT 
STATEMENTS 2 
II. JACKSON'S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED 
ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING DETECTIVE WINTERS TO 
RECOUNT KATHY'S PRIOR STATEMENTS IS PRESERVED 6 
III. KATHY'S ALLEGED MOTIVATION TO FABRICATE PREDATED 
HER STATEMENTS TO DETECTIVE WINTERS 11 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF OFFICER 
WARE'S AND DETECTIVE WINTERS'S RECITATIONS OF THEIR 
INTERVIEWS WITH KATHY WAS PREJUDICIAL 13 
V. JACKSON'S BATSON CHALLENGE WAS TIMELY 15 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE 
TO REOPEN ITS CASE AND PRESENT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE 
REGARDING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE 18 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
WHEN IT DENIED JACKSON'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE 21 
CONCLUSION 24 
I 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991) 17 
Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 6 
Holmstrom v. C.R. England, Inc., 2000 UT App 239, 8 P.3d 281 ....6 
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d480 20 
Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 830 P.2d 270 (Utah 1992) 7 
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 6, 7 
State v. Bruno, 256 P. 109 (Utah 1927) 18 
State v. Bujan, 2006 UT App 322, 142 P.3d 581 7, 14 
State v. Buian, 2008 UT 47, 190 P.3d 1255 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14 
State v. Garcia, 2007 UT App 228, 164P.3d 1264 6,7 
State v. Harris, 264 P.2d 284 (Utah 1953) 18, 19 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346 6, 11 
State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 973 P.2d404 2, 3 
State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985) 23 
State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1989) 13, 23 
State v. Rosa-Re. 2008 UT 53, 190 P.3d 1259 17 
State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388 (Utah 1957) 13, 14,23 
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998) 3 
State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 162 P.3d 1106 22, 23 
State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, 140 P.3d 1219 15, 17 
State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, 37 P.3d 260 7 
State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, 164 P.3d 397 6 
ii 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 20A-3-310 (2007) 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-104 (2008) 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-204 (2008) 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-501 (2008) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (2003) 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (Supp. 2006) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-501 (2008) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-502 (2008) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-503 (2008) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-504 (2008) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-505(2008) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-506 (2008) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (2008) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (2008) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-509 (2008) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (2008) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-511 (2008) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-512 (2008) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-513 (2008) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-514 (2008) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (2008) 19, 20 
Rules 
Utah R. App. P. 24 3 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16 21 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17 10, 19 
Utah R. Evid. 103 10 
IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
HENRY LOUIS JACKSON, : Case No. 20080418-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
First, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting hearsay evidence that 
prejudiced Jackson. See Aplt. Br. at 20-31. This Court should reach this argument as it 
pertains to Detective Winters because Jackson's argument is adequately briefed and 
properly preserved. See infra at Parts I, II. Further, this Court should hold the admission 
of Detective Winters's recitation of Kathy's prior consistent statements violated rule 801 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence because Kathy's alleged motive to fabricate predated her 
statements to Detective Winters. See infra at Part III. Finally, this Court should reverse 
because the trial court's erroneous admission of Officer Ware's and Detective Winters's 
recitations of their interviews with Kathy was prejudicial. Sex infra at Part IV. 
Second, the State's peremptory challenge violated equal protection. See Aplt. Br. at 
31-35. This Court should address the merits of this argument because Jackson's Bats on 
objection was timely. See infra at Part V. 
Third, the trial court erred when it allowed the State to reopen its case and present 
additional evidence regarding the aggravating circumstance. See Aplt. Br. at 39-46. This 
Court should reverse for this error because the State was required to prove identity during 
its case-in-chief and its strategic decision not to gather or admit sufficient evidence to 
prove identity was not an appropriate reason to reopen the case. See infra at Part VI. 
Fourth, Jackson argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to 
dismiss for destruction of evidence. See Aplt. Br. at 46-48. He asks this Court to reverse 
for that error because he requested that the State produce the vehicle in his request for 
discovery filed shortly after his arrest and because the destruction of the vehicle prejudiced 
his case. See infra at Part VII. 
Jackson does not respond to the State's other arguments because those arguments 
are adequately addressed in the opening brief. See Aplt. Br. at 20-50. 
ARGUMENT 
L JACKSON ADEQUATELY BRIEFED HIS ARGUMENT THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING 
DETECTIVE WINTERS TO TESTIFY ABOUT KATHY'S PRIOR 
CONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
Jackson adequately briefed his argument that the trial court abused its discretion by 
admitting "Kathy's statements to Detective Winters as prior consistent statements." Aplt. 
Br. at 26 (emphasis omitted). 
Utah's appellate courts are "not cua depository in which the appealing party may 
dump the burden of argument and research.""' State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, *pi5 973 P.2d 
404 (citations omitted). "In deciding whether an argument has been adequately briefed," 
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this Court will "look to the standard set forth in rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). Rule 24(a)(9) 
says: "The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect 
to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the 
trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). "Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to 
authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." 
Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305; see Jaeger, 1999 UT 1 at p i (same). 
The State complains that Jackson's briefing is inadequate because he "does not ever 
specify which statement(s) he finds objectionable." Aple. Br. at 24. Contrary to the 
State's claim, Jackson does not "suggest that all of Detective Winters' testimony was 
inadmissible." Aple. Br. at 24. Rather, he argues that Detective Winters's recitation of 
Kathy's prior consistent statements was inadmissible. Aplt. Br. at 26-27. In particular, as 
explained in the opening brief, Jackson argues that "Detective Winters' recitation of 
Kathy's prior statement was not admissible because Kathy's statements were not 'made 
prior to the time a motive to fabricate arose.'" Aplt. Br. at 27 (quoting State v. Bujan, 
2008 UT 47, Ifl, 190 P.3d 1255). "Further, even if Detective Winters' recitation of 
Kathy's statement was appropriate under rule 801(d)(1)(B), the trial court still erred by 
admitting Detective Winters' recollection of the interview in its 'entirety.'" Aplt. Br. at 28 
(quoting Bujan, 2008 UT 47 at 1J10) (citing R. 215:178-90). "Instead, the trial court should 
have required the State to elicit only those statements that rebutted the charge of recent 
fabrication." Aplt. Br. at 28. 
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Jackson's argument mirrors the argument raised by the defendant and accepted by 
our supreme court in Bui an. In Bujan, as here, the trial court overruled the defendant's 
repeated objections and allowed the detective to testify about the alleged victim's '"prior 
consistent statements/" Bujan, 2008 UT 47 at ^3-5 . As in this case, the defendant in 
Bujan did not challenge the prior consistent statements individually on appeal. Id at [^6. 
Rather, he argued that "it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to admit [thej 
Detective['s] [] hearsay testimony pursuant to rule 801(d)(1)(B)" because the alleged 
victim's "statements to [the] Detective [] were," as a whole, "made after a motive . . . to 
fabricate the rape arose." Id. 
Agreeing with the defendant, our supreme court did not split the prior statement into 
pieces or analyze each sentence individually. Id, at ffl|8-10. Instead, it addressed the prior 
consistent statement as a whole and determined that the alleged victim's "consistent 
statements" were inadmissible "under rule 801(d)(1)(B)" because they "were not made 
prior to the time the alleged motive to fabricate arose." Id. at l(|8. Further, "[ejven if the 
testimony had been offered for rehabilitative purposes," rather than for substantive 
purposes under rule 801(d)(1)(B), "it was still inappropriate to admit the entirety of the 
testimony." Id, at •jjlO (citation omitted). The "rule of completeness" allows statements to 
be admitted if they '"are "relevant and necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context 
the portion fof testimony] already introduced.'"" Id. (citation omitted). "[Tjhe admission 
of [the] DetectivefsJ [] recounting of her entire conversation with [the alleged victim]," 
therefore, "would likewise be inadmissible under the rule of completeness because it went 
beyond the information necessary to rebut the charges of recent fabrication." Id 
4 
Jackson asks this Court to follow our supreme court's analysis in Bujan, The trial 
court allowed Detective Winters to recount "everything she could remember of what 
[Kathy] told her." Bujan, 2008 UT 47 at «[[10; see Aplt. Br. at 27-28. In particular, the trial 
court allowed Detective Winters to testify that Kathy said: 
• Jackson "had been stalking her for months because he wanted a 
relationship with her." R. 215:182. 
• Jackson "had said she would be his until her last dying breath." R. 
215:183. 
• On November 8? Jackson had "[pjushed" her, "hit her in the face[,] and 
threatened to kill her." R. 215:183. 
• On November 9, she and Hardman "had gone and got some lunch." R. 
215:184. When they returned and "she got out of the car,. . . she saw 
Henry and his car in the parking lot." R. 215:184. She was on the 
"grassy area on the curb" when "Henry accelerated his car and hit her." 
R. 215:184. Then "he backed up," "ran over her ankle," and "turned" the 
car so it faced her again. R. 215:184-85. Then Hardman "went over to 
the car, opened the doorf,] and punched Henry." R. 215:185. Then 
Jackson "got out of the vehicle and began chasing [Hardman] through the 
parking lot" with "a butcher knife." R. 215:186. Jackson then returned 
to her and "said, You're coming with me, bitch. I'm going to kill you." 
R.215:186. 
See Aplt. Br. at 16-17, 
These statements, as a whole, were inadmissible because they "were not made prior 
to the time the alleged motive to fabricate arose, as is required for admission under rule 
801(d)(1)(B)." Bujan, 2008 UT 47 at ^8; see Aplt. Br. at 27; infra at Part III. Further, 
even if Detective Winters's recitation of Kathy's statements was appropriate under rule 
801(d)(1)(B), the trial court still erred by admitting Detective Winters's recollection of the 
interview in its "entirety." Bujan, 2008 UT 47 at TJ10; R- 215:178-90; see Aplt. Br. at 28. 
5 
Instead, the trial court should have required the State to elicit only those statements that 
rebutted the charge of recent fabrication. Bui an, 2008 UT 47 at f^ 10; see Aplt. Br. at 28. 
IL JACKSON'S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY ALLOWING DETECTIVE WINTERS TO 
RECOUNT KATHY'S PRIOR STATEMENTS IS PRESERVED 
"In criminal cases, '"specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of 
the trial court record'" before the issue can be heard on appeal." State v. Worwood, 2007 
UT 47, TJ16, 164 P.3d 397. The preservation rule exists because: (1) "the trial court ought 
to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it," and 
(2) "a defendant should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of 
enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails, . . . 
claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^|11, 10 
P.3d 346 (alterations in original) (quotations and citations omitted). 
An issue is properly preserved if it is "'raised to a level of consciousness such that 
the trial judge can consider it.5" State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(citation omitted); see Worwood, 2007 UT 47 at 1fi|16, 19 (holding issue "must be '"raised 
to a level of consciousness" that allows the trial court an adequate opportunity to address 
it" (citations omitted)); State v. Garcia, 2007 UT App 228, ^9, 164 P.3d 1264 (holding 
issue is preserved if it is "'"presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has 
an opportunity to rule on that issue5"" (citations omitted)); Holmstrom v. C.R. England, 
Inc., 2000 UT App 239,1f26, 8 P.3d 281 (same); Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 
P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (same). 
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This is true even if the party raised the issue "indirectly" or with less detail than on 
appeal. Brown, 856 P.2d at 361 (quotations and citations omitted). Thus, in Garcia, this 
Court determined that the State's argument relying on the "Franks doctrine" was preserved 
even though "the State did not formally cite the Franks case below," because it "argued the 
underlying premise of the Franks doctrine" and this Court had "no doubt the trial court was 
on notice of the State's legal argument." Garcia, 2007 UT App 228 at [^10; see, e.g., State 
v. Bujan, 2006 UT App 322,1fi|21-22, 142 P.3d 581 (holding "counsel's objections, in 
conjunction with the court's reliance on rule 801, were sufficient to preserve the issue for 
appeal" because "both of the policies articulated in Holgate" were satisfied and "the trial 
court clearly understood that counsel's objection pertained to rule 801 when it allowed 
[detective] to testify with regard to [alleged victim's] out-of-court statements under that 
rule"), affd, Bujan, 2008 UT 47; see State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, Tf25 n. 4, 37 
P.3d 260 (addressing identity issue even though not specifically preserved because 
defendant preserved probable cause issue and identity included in probable cause issue); 
Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 830 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah 1992) (stating that although 
"[defendant's] objections were not textbook examples of specificity," they nonetheless 
"adequately directed the trial judge's attention to the claimed error" such that "they were 
sufficient"). 
In this case, Jackson preserved his argument that Detective Winters's recitation of 
Kathy's prior consistent statements was inadmissible under rule 801(d)(1)(B). The State 
claims that Jackson's objection was "strictly limited" to perjury and did not encompass his 
underlying argument that Kathy lied to the police following the incident because she "was 
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trying to avoid being charged for her substantive conduct during the November 9 
incident." Aplc. Br. at 26 & n.3. This argument fails because the State and the trial court 
both understood that Jackson's charge of recent fabrication was not based on the narrow, 
statutory definition of one particular type of perjury but on the fact that Kathy believed that 
if she uchange[d] her story" at trial she would "facfc] additional criminal charges" and 
could be sent back to prison. R. 215:90-91. 
Jackson did not question Kathy about perjury because she changed her story at trial. 
See Aple. Br. at 26. Nor did he argue that "Kathy was committing perjury because she 
'showed up in court today and gave a different story than [she had] given in the past.'" 
Aple. Br. at 26 (quoting R. 215:90). On the contrary, he acknowledged that Kathy's 
statements had been basically consistent and asked Kathy what she thought would happen 
"//[she] showed up at court today and gave a different story than [she had] given in the 
past." R. 215:90. He then used her responses to argue that her statements—both to the 
police and at trial—were false. R. 215:90-91; 216:65-67. She lied to the police originally 
because she wanted to protect herself and Hardman from being charged with offenses 
related to their roles in the incident. R. 215:90-91; 216:65-67. And she maintained the lies 
at trial because she believed that if she changed her story she would wwfac[e] additional 
criminal charges" and could be sent back to prison. R. 215:90-91; 216:23, 65-67. 
In context, this is how Jackson's cross-examination of Kathy proceeded: 
Defense Counsel: And Ms. Capellen, have you had any 
conversations with anyone about what happens to you if you 
show up in court today and change your story? 
Kathy: No. 
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Defense Counsel: Okay. What do you imagine would happen 
to you if you showed up in court today and gave a different 
story than you've given in the past? 
Kathy: They -
Prosecutor: Objection. Calls for speculation. 
Trial Court: Sustained. You don't need to answer. 
Defense Counsel: Are you familiar with the State's laws on 
perjury? 
Kathy: Yes, I am. 
Defense Counsel: Do you understand perjury is a crime? 
Kathy: Yes, I do. 
Defense Counsel: So you understand if you came into court 
today and changed your story from how you told it in the past, 
you could be facing additional criminal charges? 
Kathy: Yes, I do. 
Defense Counsel: And you don't like being in prison, do you? 
Kathy: No, I don't. 
Defense Counsel: You don't want to spend any extra time there 
if you can help it? 
Kathy: No, I do not. 
Defense Counsel: And you understand that iht prison is 
controlled and governed by the State -
Prosecutor: Objection, your Honor. This - she doesn't have 
any competency to testify to this. 
Trial Court: Sustained. We're done with this line of 
questioning, counsel. Go to your next -
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, if we could approach. 
9 
Trial Court: No, we don't need to approach. 
Defense Counsel: Okay. 
R. 215:90-91. 
Although the trial court prevented Jackson from continuing the line of questioning, 
Jackson's purpose in asking the questions is clear: He wanted to show that Kathy lied 
during the police interviews and that she would tell the same lies at trial because she 
believed that if she changed her story, she would face additional charges and could face 
additional prison time. See R. 215:90-91; 216:65-67. 
Jackson did not explain the purpose of his questions until closing argument. Cf. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17(g)(3)-(7) (explaining that argument comes after the presentation of 
evidence); Utah R. Evid. 103(c) ("Injury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the 
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury 
by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the 
hearing of the jury."). The State and the trial court, however, understood the "implied" 
purpose of the questions. R. 216:22-24. When the parties and the trial court later 
recounted the sidebar conference in which Jackson objected to Detective Winters's 
testimony and the trial court overruled the objection, both the State and the trial court 
indicated that they understood the "suggestion and implication . . . of recent fabrication" 
raised by Jackson's line of questioning. R. 216:22-24. Then, without indicating a need for 
additional explanation, the trial court ruled that "prior statements by [KathyJ could come in 
under 801" because a "proper influence or motive had been raised." R. 216:23-24. 
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Thus, Jackson's argument is properly preserved because he gave the trial court "an 
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it," and he did not 
"forego making an objection with the strategy of enhancing] [his] chances of acquittal." 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^11 (alterations in original) (quotations and citations omitted). 
IIL KATHY'S ALLEGED MOTIVATION TO FABRICATE PREDATED 
HER STATEMENTS TO DETECTIVE WINTERS 
As explained in Part II, Jackson's charge of recent fabrication was not based on the 
narrow, statutory definition of one particular type of perjury. Sec supra at Part II. Part 5 
of Utah Code title 76, chapter 8, is titled "Falsification of Official Matters." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-501 to -514 (2008). The term "perjury" is not used in or limited to any one 
section in this Part; in particular, it is not used in or limited to section 76-8-502. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-502 ("A person is guilty of a felony of the second degree if in any 
official proceeding: . . . [h]e makes a false material statement under oath or affirmation or 
swears or affirms the truth of a material statement previously made and he does not believe 
the statement to be true."); but see Aple. Br. at 26. Rather, "perjury," at least as it is 
colloquially understood and as it was used in this case to elicit information from a witness 
who had no legal training, is a general term that may refer to any of the offenses listed in 
Part 5. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 20A-3-310(l)(b) (2007) ("Any person violating this 
subsection is guilty of perjury and may be prosecuted and punished as provided in Title 76, 
Chapter 8, Part 5."); Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-104(3) (2008) ("Any willful false swearing as 
to the purported material facts set out in this report constitutes the crime of perjury and 
shall be punished as such under Title 76, Utah Criminal Code."); Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-
204(3) (2008) (same). 
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Nor was Jackson's charge of recent fabrication based on an argument that "Kathy 
was committing perjury because she 'showed up in court today and gave a different story 
than [she had] given in the past.'" Aple. Br. at 26 (quoting R. 215:90). Jackson did not 
argue that Kathy changed her story at trial. See R. 214-16. To the contrary, he 
acknowledged that Kathy's statements to the police and at trial were basically consistent. 
In the part of the record quoted by the State, Jackson asked Kathy what she thought would 
happen to her "z/[she] showed up at court today and gave a different story than [she had] 
given in the pasl." R. 215:90. He then used her responses to argue that her statements to 
the police and at trial—though consistent—were false. R. 215:90-91; 216:65-67. 
In sum, Jackson's rule 801 argument was not tied to one particular definition of 
perjury or one particular perjury statute. Rather, his argument was that Kathy lied to the 
police because she wanted to protect herself and Hardman from being charged with 
offenses related to their roles in the incident. R. 215:90-91; 216:65-67. And she 
maintained the lies at trial because she believed that if she changed her story she would 
"fac[c] additional criminal charges" and could be sent back to prison. R. 215:90-91; 
216:23, 65-67. Thus, Kathy's statements to Detective Winters were not "made prior to the 
time a motive to fabricate arose." Bui an, 2008 UT 47 at ^(1. Rather, the interview 
"occurred after the alleged motive for [Kathy] to fabricate the [attempted murder] 
allegations] arose." Id. at ^8. "Therefore, [Kathy's] consistent statements were not made 
prior to the time the alleged motive to fabricate arose, as is required for admission under 
rule 801(d)(1)(B)." IcL Additionally, the testimony was also "inadmissible under the rule 
of completeness" because Detective Winters "was not asked to complete or rebut any 
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particular statements from [Kathy's] prior testimony." Id. at J^IO. Instead, she "testified to 
her entire conversation with [Kathy], recounting chronologically everything she could 
remember of what [Kathy] told her." IdL Thus, her testimony "went beyond the 
information necessary to rebut the charges of recent fabrication." Id. 
IV, THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF OFFICER 
WARE'S AND DETECTIVE WINTERS'S RECITATIONS OF THEIR 
INTERVIEWS WITH KATHY WAS PREJUDICIAL 
When assessing prejudice, this Court will not apply the sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
standard; "rather, it focuses on the taint caused by the error." State v. Mitchell 779 P.2d 
1116, 1121-22 (Utah 1989). In State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388 (Utah 1957), our supreme 
court rejected the State's argument that "the defendant's guilt was so plainly manifest that 
to receive [the police officer's inadmissible hearsay testimony] did not result in prejudice 
in the cause." Sibcrt, 310 P.2d at 392. 
In attempting to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it must be assumed that all of the State's 
evidence was presented for that purpose. The jury may well 
have regarded the officer's evidence as more persuasive than 
that of [the alleged victim]. From the record it appears that he 
was more confident and self-assured, and was able to be more 
definite as to the detail of the crime than the complaining 
witness himself. It is a delicate task for a reviewing court to 
attempt to appraise what weight particular evidence may have 
had with the jury. It would be going a long way indeed for [the 
Court] to entirely discount the possibility that [a police 
officer's inadmissible hearsay testimony] had some effect upon 
[the jury's] deliberations. It is the exclusive prerogative of the 
jury to judge the weight of the evidence and the facts to be 
found therefrom. It is of grave importance, particularly in 
criminal trials, that such prerogative be left to them and that the 
proceedings be conducted in such manner as to assure every 
safeguard to the rights of defendants. 
Id. at 392-93. 
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Likewise, in Bujan, this Court held the admission of the detective's "hearsay 
testimony was prejudicial and therefore requires reversal." Bujan, 2006 UT App 322 at 
Y|30-33, affd, Bujan, 2008 UT 47. "There was no physical evidence of [the] sexual 
assault, and no testimony directly supporting [the alleged victim's] account of the night in 
question. Therefore, Detective['s] [] testimony provided the only corroboration of [the] 
alleged rape." Bujan, 2006 UT App 322 at ^32. "As such," this Court could not say that 
the detective's "testimony constituted harmless error." Id (citation omitted). 
As explained in the opening brief, neither Officer Ware's nor Detective Winters's 
testimony was "'merely cumulative to that already testified to by the victim.'" Aple. Br. at 
22 (citations omitted); see Aplt. Br. at 28-31. As in Bujan, credibility played a crucial role 
in this case. Kathy's and Hardman's testimony provided the only evidence to support their 
version of the altercation from its inception until Jackson exited the vehicle. See Aplt. Br. 
at 28. Thus, Officer Ware's and Detective Winters's "testimony provided the only 
corroboration o f Kathy's and Hardman's claim that Jackson was the aggressor: He 
purposely struck Kathy with his vehicle and he did not act against Hardman in self-
defense. Bujan, 2006 UT App 322 at f\}31-32; see Aplt. Br. at 28. Further, as in Sjbert, 
both officers' testimony was "more confident and self-assured" than Kathy's and, in some 
instances, was "more definite as to the detail of the crime than" Kathy's. Sibert, 310 P.2d 
at 392; see Aplt. Br. at 28-31. 
In sum, Kathy and Hardman each had reasons to lie to the police and to maintain 
the lie at trial. Officer Ware and Detective Winters, on the other hand, were credible, 
articulate witnesses who corroborated Kathy and Hardman's claim that Jackson was the 
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aggressor and bolstered the credibility of their story. There is a reasonable probability, 
therefore, that the jury would have acquitted if the trial court had not erroneously admitted 
Officer Ware's and/or Detective Winters's hearsay testimony. 
V. JACKSON'S BATSONCHALLENGE WAS TIMELY 
State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, 140 P.3d 1219 (ValdezJQ) did not hold that a 
defendant must "obtain a ruling on his Batson objection prior to dismissal of the venire." 
Aple. Br. at 30. To the contrary, Valdez II held only that a defendant must raise his 
Batson challenge "both before the jury is sworn and before the remainder of the venire is 
dismissed in order to be deemed timely/' Valdez II, 2006 UT 39 at i|]26.1 
When read in context, the language from Valdez II cited in the State's brief 
supports this reading of Valdez II. The State claims that Valdez II holds a Batson 
objection must be decided before the jury is sworn and the venire is dismissed "'in order to 
1
 Sec also Valdez II, 2006 UT 39 at p 0 (noting "that challenges to the jury, both to the 
composition of the venire and the composition of the petit jury, must be raised before the 
jury is sworn or they are untimely" (emphasis added)); icL at |^35 ("In all of this court's 
decisions since Span, we have never deviated from the rule that a challenge to the 
composition of the jury must be rawed before the jury is sworn in." (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added)); icL at |^35 ("It has therefore long been the law in Utah that 
constitutional challenges to the composition of the jury—both the venire and to the 
selected jury—must be rawed before the jury is sworn." (emphasis added)); icL at p 7 ("It 
is nonetheless clear under Utah law that a constitutional challenge to the jury selection 
process—whether it be to the entire venire or to the jury selected to try the case—must be 
brought before the jury is sworn." (emphasis added)); id. at [^38 ("We hold that a Batson 
challenge must be raised not only before the jury is sworn, but also before the remainder 
of the venire is dismissed in order to be deemed timely under Utah law." (emphasis 
added)); id. at [^40 ("Obviously, if a Batson violation is to be remedied by seating the 
wrongfully struck juror, . . . a Batson challenge must be razeed before the venire is 
dismissed if the trial court is to properly rule on it." (citation omitted) (emphasis added)); 
id. at *SJ43 ("The rule we set forth, which requires that a Batson challenge be raised both 
before the jury is sworn and before the venire is dismissed, efficiently allows the trial court 
to determine the issues the Batson test is designed to resolve." (emphasis added)). 
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allow the trial court to adequately remedy a Batson violation if one has occurred/" Aple. 
Br. at 30 (quoting Valdez II 2006 UT 39 at f33 n.19). In reality, the opinion says: "A 
Batson challenge must be raised both before the jury is sworn and before the venire is 
dismissed in order to allow the trial court to adequately remedy a Batson violation if one 
has occurred." Valdez II, 2006 UT 39 at |^33 n.19 (citation omitted). 
Likewise, the State claims that Valdez II holds that: 
If an objection is raised—but not ruled on—prior to dismissal 
of the venire, the judge is prevented from "reinstating the 
stricken juror," thus requiring a mistrial. The supreme court 
accordingly saw "no legitimate reason to sanction such an 
inefficient use of judicial time and resources," and it therefore 
held that even allowing a "Batson challenge to proceed after 
the venire has been dismissed is only to sanction abuse." 
Aple. Br. at 30 (quoting Valdez II, 2006 UT 39 at 1)44) (emphasis in original). Actually, at 
this point in the opinion, our supreme court was listing the reasons why a Batson challenge 
"must be raised" before the jury is sworn and the venire is excused. Valdez II, 2006 UT 39 
at i[j44. In context, the opinion says: 
In addition, a Batson challenge must be raised in such a 
manner that the trial court is able to fashion a remedy in the 
event a Batson violation has occurred. As the Johnson Court 
noted, the Batson test "encourages prompt rulings on 
objections to peremptory challenges without substantial 
disruption of the jury selection process." Id. (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). A Batson violation can only 
be remedied without substantially disrupting the jury selection 
process if it is brought before the venire is dismissed. If a 
Batson violation is found before the venire is dismissed, the 
violation can be remedied simply by reinstating the stricken 
juror. Once the venire has been dismissed, however, a 
sustained Batson challenge will require the trial judge to, at 
minimum, call additional jurors, and may require the judge to 
call an entirely new venire from which to select a new jury. 
Also, if a Batson violation is found after the jury has been 
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sworn and the venire excused, the only available remedy is a 
mistrial. We see no legitimate reason to sanction such an 
inefficient use of judicial time and resources, or to allow such a 
burden to be imposed on the parties. Moreover, to allow a 
Batson challenge to proceed after the venire has been 
dismissed is only to sanction abuse. If such a result were 
allowed, a party would be able to delay raising a Batson 
challenge until it determined whether it approved of the 
selected jury. Such sandbagging is antithetical to notions of 
judicial economy and procedural fairness. 
Valdez II, 2006 UT 39 at [^44 (first two emphases added) (footnote and citation omitted). 
Our supreme court did not issue its mandate that defense counsel "has an absolute 
obligation to notify the court that resolution [of the Batson objection] is needed before the 
jury is sworn and the venire dismissed" until Rosa Re, which was published after 
Jackson's trial. State v. Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, ^ 14, 190 P.3d 1259. 
The State does not challenge Jackson's argument that he was not required to 
comply with Rosa-Re's waiver rule. See Aplt. Br. at 35; Aple. Br. at 29-30. This is 
correct because a court cannot prevent review of a Batson claim by applying "a rule 
unannounced at the time of petitioner's trial." Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991). 
Plus, in Rosa-Re, our supreme court specifically held that failing "to notify the court that 
resolution [of the Batson objection] is needed before the jury is sworn and the venire 
dismissed" will only "constitute a waiver" of the Batson objection "in the future." Rosa-
Re, 2008 UT 53 at ^14. Thus, this Court should reach Jackson's Batson challenge because 
it was timely. 
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VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO 
REOPEN ITS CASE AND PRESENT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE 
REGARDING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE 
First, the State claims that "Utah courts have long allowed the State to prove the 
existence of a prior conviction by submitting documents establishing that a person with the 
same name had been convicted of the stated crime." Aple. Br. at 44 (citing State v. Harris, 
264 P.2d 284, 284-86 (Utah 1953); State v. Bruno, 256 P. 109, 109-11 (Utah 1927)). 
Neither Harris nor Bruno, however, supports the State's claim. 
In Harris, our supreme court explained that the rule where "identity of names is 
prima facie evidence of identity of persons" is only recognized "sometimes" and is the 
subject of "some conflict of authority." Harris, 264 P.2d at 286 (citations and footnotes 
omitted). Plus, *'[e]ven where the rule is applied, the names must be identical" Id. 
(emphasis added). 
Thus, in Harris, "[t]he fact that one Mose Harris had been convicted would not, in 
any event, constitute prima facie proof that the defendant Moses H. Harris had been 
previously convicted. There would have to be other proof that such names referred to the 
same individual before the matter could go to the jury." Id Whereas, in Bruno, evidence 
that a person with the exact same name as the defendant "pleaded guilty to having 
intoxicating liquor in her possession as shown by the records of the city court" was 
sufficient evidence—not necessarily to prove the element—but to "submit[] to the jury in 
thfat] case." Bruno, 256 P. at 110. 
In this case, even if the "identity of names [was] prima facie evidence of identity of 
persons," the rule did not apply because the name given in the SJ&C was not "identical" to 
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Jackson's name. Harris, 264 P.2d at 286. Jackson's name is Henry Louis Jackson. 
Whereas, the name in the SJ&C is "Henry L. Jackson." R. 207:3; State's Bench Trial Ex. 
6. Thus, for the evidence to be sufficient, u[tjhere would have to be other proof that such 
names referred to the same individual." Harris, 264 P.2d at 286. As explained in the 
opening brief, however, the evidence presented at trial—before the trial court reopened the 
case and granted the State additional time to gather its evidence—was insufficient to 
clearly and definitely prove that Jackson "had previously been convicted of aggravated 
murder, murder, or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-202(i) (Supp. 2006); see Aplt. Br. at 39-46. 
Second, the State claims that Jackson's closing argument asking the court to acquit 
him of the aggravating circumstance because the State failed to prove identity was "a new 
defense." Aple. Br. at 47. It argues that reopening the case was an issue "of 'fairness,'" 
not of whether Jackson admitted the identity clement. Aple. Br. at 46 (citation omitted). 
And it claims, without citation, that "[t]he purpose" of the bench trial "was to determine 
whether [Jackson] actually had a prior conviction for murder." Aple. Br. at 47. 
In each of these arguments, the State attempts to shift the burden of proof to 
Jackson. Identity was an essential element of the offense that the State had to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt during its case-in-chief. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
501(1) (2008) ("A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until 
each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted."); id at § 77-17-3 (2008) ("When 
it appears to the court that there is not sufficient evidence to put a defendant to his defense, 
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it shall forthwith order him discharged."); Utah R. Crim. P. 17(g)(3)-(5) ("The prosecution 
shall offer evidence in support of the charge; . . . When the prosecution has rested, the 
defense may present its case; . . . Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence 
unless the court, for good cause, otherwise permits."); R. 154 ("The defendant is presumed 
to be innocent of the charge."). 
If the State failed to meet its burden of proof, then Jackson's presumption of 
innocence was not surmounted and he should have been "discharged" from the aggravating 
circumstance element of the offense. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3; see Menzies v. Galetka, 
2006 UT 81,1J121, 150 P.3d 480 (Wilkins, J , concurring) ("[0]ur joint agreement, 
embodied in both state and federal constitutions, provides the benefit of the doubt to the 
accused. Periodically, some of the guilty go free as a result of the high burden we have all 
imposed upon the State to prove our guilt. This allows us to be more certain that only the 
guilty are punished."); Aplt. Br. at 39-46. 
Perhaps, if the State's failure to prove identity in its case-in-chief was due to an 
oversight, fairness might have justified the trial court's decision to reopen the case to 
present additional evidence. See Aplt. Br. at 39-40. The record, however, shows that the 
State's failure to prove identity was the result of a conscious decision, not an oversight. 
See id at 40. The State assessed its evidence and concluded that the name Henry Jackson 
on the Information and SJ&C was "sufficient" to prove its case. R. 207:4. Further, on 
appeal, the Stale does not claim that its evidentiary failing below was due to oversight. 
See Aple. Br. at 44-47. 
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The State, therefore, has identified no justifiable reason for its failure to present 
sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden. Accordingly, this Court should reverse because 
the trial court abused its discretion when it reopened the State's case and granted the State 
a second bite at the apple. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN 
IT DENIED JACKSON'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE 
First, Jackson requested that the State produce the vehicle when he filed his request 
for discovery shortly after his arrest. R. 11-12. The vehicle was important evidence: It 
was physical evidence seized from Jackson, it was the alleged murder weapon in Count I, 
and it may have contained exculpatory evidence regarding Counts II, III, and IV. See 
Aplt. Br. at 47-48. Thus, to compel the State to produce the vehicle, Jackson did not have 
to request the vehicle individually or explain the vehicle's probative value. See Aple. Br. 
at 48-50. Rather, he had only to request discovery for the "physical evidence seized from" 
him. Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a)(3). Jackson made this request: 
On November 27, 2006, he requested "[a]ny photographs, video and/or audio 
recordings, or physical evidence taken from the defendant. . . and/or the alleged crime 
scene or taken by any such law enforcement officer during the course of the investigation 
of [Jackson's] case by such police department, District Attorney, its staff or investigative 
agencies." R. 11-12. He also requested "[a]ny evidence which tends to negate the guilt of 
the defendant, or mitigate the guilt of the defendant or mitigate the degree of the offense 
that has been discovered"; and u[~r]ep°rts or descriptions of any weapon or other physical 
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evidence seized from defendant[']s person or his residence or vehicle that the State intends 
to use at trial." R. 11-12. 
Second, Jackson argues that his claim of prejudice is not "pure speculation." Aple. 
Br. at 50. Rather, there is "a reasonable probability" that the vehicle "would be 
exculpatory." State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49,1J44, 162 P.3d 1106. Further, he believes 
that the "prejudice" to his case when the vehicle was destroyed was so "extreme" that 
"fundamental fairness" required the case to be dismissed. Id. at 1J45. 
There was blood in the vehicle. R. 97-98; 139:5. This blood may have been from 
Jackson himself or from the pit bull. R. 97-98; 139:5. There may also have been saliva, 
bite marks, or claw marks from the pit bull. If so, it would have supported his claim that 
Hardman and the pit bull attacked him in his vehicle and that he acted in self-defense. R. 
216.61-70. Without this evidence, Jackson could not substantiate his claim that Kathy and 
Hardman were lying. See Aplt. Br. at 48; R. 216:64-70. Nor could he provide evidence to 
support his version of the incident. See Aplt. Br. at 48; R. 216:64-70. Instead, he could 
only ask the jury to believe his version of the events because he would have found 
evidence in the vehicle if the State had not destroyed it. S^ ee Aplt. Br. at 48; R. 216:68, 70. 
The State claims that Jackson was not prejudiced because his conduct "could not be 
self-defense under Utah law." Aple. Br. at 52. Whether Jackson acted in self-defense, 
however, was a factual issue for the jury to decide, not the State. See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-402(2003). Self-defense was Jackson's defense. SeeR. 169-70; 216:6-9, 61-69; 
Aple. Br. at 26 n.3, 39. The State has not argued that the jury was improperly instructed to 
consider self-defense. See Aple. Br. at 16-54. Thus, self-defense was properly before the 
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jury and it was the jury's duty to decide whether the State disproved Jackson's claim of 
self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211,214 (Utah 
1985) (U[AJ defendant is not required to establish a defense of self-defense beyond a 
reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance of the evidence"; rather, "if the issue is 
raised, whether by the defendant's or the prosecution's evidence, the prosecution has the 
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in self-defense." 
(citations omitted)); R. 170. The jury, however, could not properly assess the case because 
the State's destruction of the evidence prevented it from hearing Jackson's side of the 
story. See Mitchell, 779 P.2d at 1121-22 (When assessing prejudice, this Court will not 
apply the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard; "rather, it focuses on the taint caused by 
the error."); Sibcrt, 310 P.2d at 392-93 ("It is the exclusive prerogative of the jury to judge 
the weight of the evidence and the facts to be found therefrom. It is of grave importance, 
particularly in criminal trials, that such prerogative be left to them and that the proceedings 
be conducted in such manner as to assure every safeguard to the rights of defendants."). 
The prejudice to Jackson is particularly acute when weighed against "the reason for 
the destruction or loss of the evidence." Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49 at ^44. The State 
destroyed the vehicle because it had no need for the evidence: It decided—without benefit 
of blood testing or a jury verdict—that it knew who the aggressor was and who the victims 
were. R. 215:187-88, 191. So it destroyed the evidence without giving Jackson an 
opportunity to examine it for exculpatory evidence. R. 97-98; 139:3-4. Jackson, therefore, 
asks this Court to reverse because the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss 
for destruction of evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
First; this Court should reverse with an order to dismiss because the trial court erred 
when it denied Jackson's motion to dismiss. Second, this Court should reverse and remand 
for a new trial because the State's peremptory strike violated equal protection and the trial 
court prejudiced Jackson by admitting inadmissible hearsay and/or photographs. Third, 
this Court should reverse Counts I and II and enter convictions for attempted murder, a 
second degree felony, because the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the 
State to reopen its case. Finally, this Court should reverse and remand for resentencing. 
SUBMITTED this 2^\_ day of September, 2009. 
LOW J.^EPPI 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
\M^^\ 
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